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Abstract. Internet service providers are on the agenda, when considering their involvement 
in and responsibility for infringement of trademark rights. The keyword advertising by search 
engines and the activity of internet auction sites constitute the top of the iceberg, while the use of 
trademarks on social network sites and particularly in virtual worlds are up and coming issues. 
While the first two are entering trademark law through the door of criminally sanctioned 
trademark counterfeiting, there is no trade in physical goods in virtual worlds. The issue of 
trademark infringement might be raised, when virtual goods replicating physical goods are sold in-
world under someone else's trademark. Similarly, the use of service marks for competing services 
seems like free-riding. But who owns rights in trademarks in virtual worlds? This article explores 
the channelling of real world trademark law into virtual worlds and highlights some aspects that 
merit consideration. 
1 Introduction 
Johan Huizinga studied the play-element in culture and introduced the idea of a Magic Circle encapsulating the 
playground, which is marked beforehand either materially, ideally, deliberately or as a matter of course and 
within which special absolute rules apply.1 He noted that play creates order, even is order and even the least 
deviation spoils the game and makes it worthless.2 Play is distinct from ‘ordinary’ or ‘real’ life in that it is free or 
voluntary, generally disinterested; free of non-play interests and limited both in time and scope.3 Nevertheless, 
permanent play communities are common due to human propensity to want to ‘be apart together’.4  
 
Huizinga sees play in all areas of human activity: social relations, law, politics, economics and trade. For 
example, he notes: 
 
“The statistics of trade and production could not fail to introduce a sporting element into 
economic life. In consequence, there is now a sporting side to almost every triumph of 
commerce or technology: the highest turnover, the biggest tonnage, the fastest crossing, the 
greatest altitude, etc. Here a purely ludic element has, for once, got the better of utilitarian 
considerations, since experts inform us that smaller units – less monstrous steamers and 
aircraft, etc – are more efficient in the long run. Business becomes play.”5 
 
Although play-activity is often present in such serious activity, non-play activity may also be disguised as 
play. Such abuse of play Huizinga calls false play and pucrilism and is, to his mind, rampant in politics, where 
the value purism and absoluteness of play is degenerated, manipulated or reduced to technicalities that deprive  
 
 
                                                          
1
 Huizinga (1949), Homo Ludens: A Study of Play-Element in Culture, Routledge, at 7, 10 and 77. 
2
 Huizinga 1949 at 10. 
3
 Huizinga 1949 at 8-9. 
4
 Huizinga 1949 at 12. 
5
 Huizinga 1949 at 200. 
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the game of its characteristics of freedom, disinterestedness and limitedness.6 Thus, real “play…lies outside 
morals. In itself it is neither good or bad…[and a]s soon as truth and justice, compassion and forgiveness have 
part in our resolve to act…[it] looses all meaning.”7 
 
From a legal perspective the Magic Circle marks the line between what can be regulated and governed with 
non-game rules and that which cannot.8 While it would be easy to equate the Magic Circle with the click of a 
mouse or typing of a password gaining entry9 to e.g. Second Life, the legal question is more complex. Unlike 
Huizinga’s parameter of play, lawyers tend to have a fairly straightforward view on where the line between real 
world law and in-world rules should be drawn. They tend to treat like things alike and equate e.g. real-world 
theft with in-world theft applying real-world rules in determining harm and sanctions.10 Thus, theoretically 
lawyers do not recognize ‘a magic circle’ that exempts all play-actions from real world consequences.  
 
However, many users, designers and players argue that in world actions, although seemingly similar, are 
different, and that application of real-world law disrupts and even destroys the game.11 Huizinga’s argument has 
resonance: while in-world rules may not be pretty and may have gruesome consequences, it is just a game and 
nobody is really getting hurt. Even in social virtual worlds that seemingly mirror the real world, the whole point 
of the game is to make a new world, one that is different, if not necessarily better.12  
 
Joseph’s example on the practice of killing new players for their possessions in Ultima Online shows how 
differently things develop in an in-world society: 
 
“Under the new rules [change of settings by the provider], many possessions disappear from 
new player-controlled characters when they are “killed,” thus making crimes against them less 
lucrative. In addition, steps were taken to make it harder to identify new players as new. Thus, 
the so called “player-killer” can never know for sure whether he or she is attacking a 
vulnerable opponent. Persistent player-killing of “good” characters can result in the offender 
being identified as such an evil character that he or she will be killed on sight by the computer-
controlled guards merely for entering a town. Essentially, this is a system of “outlawry” in 
which the condemned are forced to live outside the normal channels of society and commerce 
available to everybody else. A system of bounties will give players additional incentives to 
“kill” those who make a habit of indiscriminate “killing”. 
 
The “player-killers” … have established player-controlled fortresses from which they venture 
out to kill and to steal. Others have found ways to trick “good” players into becoming 
aggressors in situations where the guards will kill them, thus doing the player-killer’s 
work…Some players have styled themselves as guardians who routinely patrol areas and kill 
player-killers when they are found. Other ad-hoc groups of players have confronted 
particularly egregious player-killers…giv[ing them] an ultimatum to change or be hunted 
down.”13 
 
 
                                                          
6
 Huizinga 1949 at 204-205. 
7
 Huizinga 1949 at 213. 
8
 Duranske (2008) Virtual Law: Navigating the Legal Landscape of Virtual Worlds, ABA Publishing.  
9
 Johnson and Post (1996) Law and Borders – The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 Stanford Law Review 1367 arguing that 
cyberspace should be treated as separate space for legal purposes, since it fundamentally challenges the reliance on territorial 
borders in law at 1368-1370. 
10
 Duranske 2008 at 58. 
11
 Duranske 2008 at 59. 
12
 Duranske 2008 at 60-61. 
13
 Joseph (2011), Ultima Online: Justice in a Virtual World available at http://usf.usfca.edu/pj/articles/Ultima.htm, last visited 
August 15, 2011. 
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Although no one really dies14, the form and structure of the game naturally raises questions of “what is social 
and anti-social conduct, what is just and unjust, what is “legal” and what is not”.15 While pressure initially is 
placed on the provider to change the game rules (i.e. settings) these questions are ultimately up to the 
participants themselves choosing to enforce means of social control: by continuing unchanged play, changing 
their play, organizing their play or ceasing to play.16 
2. The role of the service provider 
The role of the provider is especially interesting from the legal point of view, because it stands, so to speak, with 
one foot inside and the other outside the magic circle. The provider in-world can be merely a provider of service, 
which is, although technically participating in the game, rarely viewed as a player. The role is more like that of 
an umpire. The provider supervises play and reacts only to violations of the game rules. In practice, the provider 
may dictate rules of play and participation, refuse access and eject users that do not abide by the rules. 
Nevertheless, from the perspective of the game the provider is an outsider. 
 
This is because from the in-world perspective, although taking the legal form of a contract between the 
provider and individual users, the provider provides a playground that makes play possible without playing 
itself. Thus, the provider does not participate in the every game dynamics of “rule-making while playing” which 
introduces nuances to playing the game that may be accepted, frowned upon or rejected by the other players, and 
subsequently introduced to other players of the game making their way into the formal rules of play. In this 
regard, the provider is merely an enforcer or arbiter of disputes between users of the service. Even, if a user is 
charged with violation of real world rules for an action against another user, the role of the provider is seemingly 
neutral, e.g. closing of account or reimbursing a user based on a real world court judgment.17  
 
In any event, the game-nature of the activity incentivizes the provider to employ a laissez-faire approach to 
regulation, so as not to spoil the game by micro-managing it, and thus removing the element of unpredictability 
and fun from it. Therefore, the role of the provider in relation to users is a paradox: it has all the power, but is 
most likely to succeed (attract players, be fun) the less (more than necessary) power it exercises. 
 
On the other hand, the role of the provider, when subject to real world rules, becomes complicated when in-
world activity or player actions affect non-players. Huizinga’s magic circle does not extend to non-players and 
per definition play only exists between voluntary participants.  
 
When considering the following questions we reach our second paradox: our theoretical framework for 
defining playgrounds breaks down, while the crude lawyer’s view discussed above risks depriving the game of 
its nature as a game. To what extent do actions in-world that affect non-players incur liability? What type of 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14
 In fact, ‘death’ of a character is not necessarily final, but it can be ‘resurrected’. Usually the character loses something in 
the process assets, skills or tools. Duranske 2008 at 65 and 68. 
15
 Joseph available at http://usf.usfca.edu/pj/articles/Ultima.htm. 
16
 In fact modern virtual worlds expressly leave governance to the players. However, the only sanction available is social 
exclusion, since any other sanctioning of players by other players is not technically possible, but requires action by the 
provider of the service (breach of contract). Duranske 2008 at 69. 
17
 The service provider naturally acts with self-interest and like with any actor legal, social and market context may influence 
decision-making in individual circumstances. However, from the perspective of e.g. complying with a court order to freeze or 
terminate an account the provider is primarily a neutral, disinterested actor. Similarly, the provider primarily arbitrates player 
disputes or sanctions breach of Terms of Use without showing favouritism. For an example of the opposite, see Lim (2009) 
Who Monitors the Monitor? Virtual World Governance and the Failure of Contract Law Remedies in Virtual Worlds, 11 
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law 1053. 
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effect is sufficient to trigger liability? Who is responsible for actions in-world when the overall activity affects 
non-players? A simple in-world play-answer that does not recognize real world effects, risks perpetuating the 
player-killing scenario described by Joseph. A crude real world law-answer risks killing the game. Both 
approaches seem to draw the line based on fact18 either established by in-world or real world rules presupposing 
that there is a rule for every scenario.  
 
When it comes to the question of liability for trademark infringement, I argue that the question is more 
complex. The rules on whether trademark infringement even can occur in virtual worlds do not exist and is one 
of regulation, not application. Consequently, we search not for a simple rule, but for a system of governance that 
may regulate the overlaps between the two.19 
3.  Law and the Magic Circle 
Law and rules are only effective, if they can be enforced. Therefore, in-world rules that are absolutely enforced 
by e.g. computer-based termination of a character or the provider closing an account are naturally more like real 
world law. Like real world law the level of enforcement in practice does not determine whether a rule constitutes 
law. Non-legal sanctions such as social exclusion or refusing to play with players that do not abide by the rules 
are less binding, since it requires social acceptance of the foundation of the rule. If individual players disagree 
and stop enforcing a rule it may ultimately cease to be a rule that triggers a sanction when breached.20 Therefore, 
there is a difference between rules as “prevailing law” and rules as governance (real law). The question of 
whether real world rules apply to in-world actions can be phrased as 1) is it law (known to all), or the broader 
fundamental question 2) is it governed by law. 
 
Duranske’s  argument can be placed in the first category  i.e. asking whether rules  are followed. Duranske 
argues that this question is one of fact, not law and the legal issues arising from virtual world acts are 
problematic because they represent either too different or too simplified views of what is fact.21 His Magic Circle 
test turns on understanding, which encourages “users and designers” to choose between a closed or open world. 
 
An activity that occurs in a virtual world is subject to real-world law if the user undertaking the 
activity reasonably understood, or should have reasonably understood, at the time of acting, 
that the act would have real-world implications.22 
 
To Duranske, it does not make a difference, if the test is applied to users or providers, since providers have 
control over the design of the game the same way as users have control over their actions.23 Similarly, the 
strength of the test lies in allowing distinction between different user’s actions without thereby considering the 
fundamental question of whether the game is protected from real world law by the magic circle. Duranske’s test 
emphasizes the significance of Terms of Use as a general indicator of what rules can reasonably be understood to 
apply.24 
 
Fairfield criticizes the Magic Circle test because the distinction between virtual world and real world actions 
is artificial.25 Virtual actions originate with and impact real people even though the means are technological. 
Therefore, the legal question should turn on consent; i.e. liability arises when actions exceed consensual  
                                                          
18
 Duranske 2008 at 72. 
19
 Duranske 2008  
20
 Duranske 2008 at 69-70. 
21
 Duranske 2008 at 72-73. 
22
 Duranske at 75. 
23
 Duranske at 75-76. 
24
 Duranske 2008 at 76-77. 
25
 Fairfield (2009) The Magic Circle, 4 Vanderbilt Journal of Entertaiment and Technology Law 823 at 824-825. 
 JICLT 
Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology    
Vol. 7, Issue 2 (2012) 
116 
 
 
 
playing.26 Consent within this meaning is general, what Fairfield calls “blanket consent to the game rules as a 
package”, not informed consent, e.g. to each specific provision in the Terms of Use.27 Thus, a player may be 
considered to have consented to more than the official rules stated in Terms of Use, if the act is routine in the 
course of the game.28  
 
Legally, Fairfield’s discussion is limited to the effect of real world laws in virtual worlds between players or 
between provider and player. However, he also recognizes the significance of in-world rules in determining 
consent. Thus, while virtual worlds are subject to real world law, in-world “law” may be likened to an industry 
standard and thus gain legal force and effect.29 Like Duranske, he emphasizes the rules of the game in 
determining liability, but to him different rules govern different relationships.30 Thus, the contract may govern in 
provider-player relationship, while the rules of the game (exceeding official rules) may govern in player-player 
relationships. By contrast, real world law may not supersede the Terms of Use in provider-player relationships 
(absoluteness)31, while real world law may trump game rules in player-player relationships.  
 
Fairfield’s approach to the question whether real world law applies in-world treats the issue as one of 
governance that turns on legal consent. While in-world law may gain legal force and effect, it is on principle 
always subject to real world (law) governance and cannot be a sovereign protected by a magic circle. Thus, real 
world law may place limits on what a person can be considered to have consented to and real world law may 
never be completely excluded, although players and providers have great power to determine what law enters the 
virtual world.32  
 
Duranske’s test turns on understanding the legal consequences of acts, while Fairfield’s test turns on whether 
the consequence is permitted by law and community expectations. Both recognize, albeit differently, a boundary 
around in-world citizens and the in-world as a community. Real world law disguised as societal interests may 
enter to govern in-world actors.  
 
However, neither test addresses the question whether nor to what extent real world people (non-players) with 
real world expectations may enter and request enforcement of real world law to in-world acts. We focus on those 
next. 
4. Non-player interests as law in virtual worlds 
The question of trademark infringement in virtual worlds could easily be reduced to one of protecting property 
interests or preventing free-riding. Both miss the fundamental questions of whether there are trademark rights 
and if so, who owns them in virtual worlds. There can only be trademark infringement, if there are trademark 
rights to be infringed. Unlike physical property, like land or cars, trademarks are intangible resources that cannot 
be defined as units; a plot of land or my Ford Focus. It is tempting to argue that e.g. Coca-Cola is specific 
enough a unit that it is clear to all who owns it. However, I refer here to objects that constitute a legal unit that 
can be owned in the legal sense. As such, the legal unit, which is a trademark right in the Coca-Cola trademark, 
is very different from and much more restricted than it appears. Indeed, unlike my car, which I own as one unit, 
the trademark right Coca-Cola Company owns is the COCA-COLA word mark, the Coca-Cola picture mark, the 
Coca-Cola logo, the slogan “Coca-Cola is it” and so forth, all registered for a specific category of goods or 
services.  
                                                          
26
 Fairfield 2009 at 825 and 831-832. 
27
 Fairfield 2009 at 832. 
28
 Fairfield 2009 at 833. 
29
 Fairfield 2009 at 830. 
30
 Fairfield 2009 at 833. 
31
 Lim criticizes that the provider has absolute control over enforcement, when it may lead to severe infringement on the 
rights of players. Lim 2009. 
32
 Fairfield 2009 at 837. 
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The perceived absolute ownership thus follows from 1) ownership of a portfolio of trademark rights that 2) 
cover several product categories outside the primary soda market and that are 3) based on separate registrations 
in most of the world’s jurisdictions. The Coca-Cola Company does not own just one car, but the equivalent of all 
cars in a Ford Factory parking lot. While all are perceived as generating with Coca-Cola Company (or Ford) 
legally they are treated as units that can be separately owned. Legally, therefore, each right can be bought, sold, 
held, lost or infringed.  
 
Trademark rights are acquired through use or registration of a trade symbol for the purposes of distinguishing 
one’s products or services from those of another trader. Trademarks are registered for specific goods or services 
and the right consists of preventing other traders from using signs, which are likely to cause confusion as to 
source within the consuming public between the goods/services bearing the trademark and the sign. The same 
sign can be registered and used for different products or services within the same jurisdiction and the same 
trademark for the same products or services may be owned by different entities in different jurisdictions.33  
 
Whether trademarks rights exist in virtual worlds depends on whether 1) someone owns them through use or 
registration 2) maintains them by continuously using them in commerce and 3) whether someone’s use of a sign 
in the virtual world is likely to cause confusion as to source in the mind of the consumer. The above not-
withstanding a trader (or anyone) may use another’s trademark, if there is due cause. Thus, trademark rights 
cannot be invoked against most non-confusing, non-commercial or non-source-identifying uses.  
 
Thus, the legal question of infringement of a trademark right is theoretically not as simple as stealing a car. 
Neither, is it as simple as joy-riding, free riding or hitch-hiking. First, the trademark is non-rivalrous34 and 
therefore is not lost or lessened by legitimate uses, nor by theft. It can also legitimately be used by the public and 
by other traders. Technologically these acts are indistinguishable by themselves. Second, each offence presumes 
ownership of what is taken; the car, the use of the car, the payment for use of the car or the non-payment for the 
use of the car. Third, if we have a car without an owner or an owner, but no car, can stealing, joy-riding, free 
riding or hitch-hiking per definition ever occur?  
 
Fourth, there is the question of who owns rights in unowned previously non-existing matter. By analogy, if I 
have valid title to my Ford Focus and so does my neighbour to his Ford Focus, do either of us have valid title to 
a 2012 Ford Focus or the Ford Focus left standing between our houses? Unlike adverse possession of land, i.e. 
physical space that either is visibly possessed by the owner or possessor, the trademark analogy would turn on 
proof of proximity, not proof of possession to establish legal possession that amounts to ownership. I could 
claim ownership of a 2012 Ford Focus, because people know that I possess my own Ford Focus. 
 
Applying Locke’s theory of ownership to the fruits of one’s labour may extend rights, where there is 
reputation, but his theory only extends to what is not lawfully held by others (common or private property).35 
Thus, regardless of reputation, a trademark owner may regularly only prevent uses that interfere with the source-
identifying function of the trademark, i.e. the existing trademark right. However, the concept of blurring the 
distinctiveness or repute of a trademark on line is still very much under debate.36  
                                                          
33
 The principle of territoriality of intellectual property rights is enshrined in the TRIPS Agreement The Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco on 15 April 1994. U.N.T.S. 1867, p. 3. The groundwork for this principle was 
laid in 1883 with the signing of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of March 20, 1883, as revised 
at Brussels on December 14, 1900, at Washington on June 2, 1911, at The Hague on November 6, 1925, at London on 
June 2, 1934, at Lisbon on October 31, 1958, and at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, and as amended on September 28, 1979. 
U.N.T.S. 828, p. 305. 
34
 Barry (2004) Property rights in common and civil law at 192; Brosseau (2004) Property Rights in the Digital Space at 465; 
and Isaac and Park (2004) On Intellectual Property Rights: Patents versus free and open development at 386-387 in 
Colombatto (Ed.) The Elgar Companion to the Economics of Property Rights Edwar Elgar Publishing. 
35
 Locke (1690) Two Treatises of Government Peter Laslett (Ed. 1988) Cambridge University Press at 285-286, 302. 
36
 The Google Adwords -case (Joined cases C-236/08-C-238/08 Google France and Google [2010] ECR I-0000), the L’Oreal 
v. Bellure -case (Case C- 487/07, L’oréal SA, Lancôme parfums et beauté & Cie SNC and Laboratoire Garnier & Cie v. 
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Unlike the theory of adverse possession the underlying theory of dilution by blurring is that the trademark 
owner has already established rights through use outside the scope of registered rights and that the infringer 
trespasses on that right. Thus, if I fail to register my Ford Focus in my name and someone steals it, I can claim 
theft by proving that I am the owner. Similarly, if a trademark owner can establish a prior right, regardless of 
registration, then it can be infringed and infringement sanctioned. However, the opposite approach; proving 
defendant’s use of a sign and similarity to one’s own mark, misses the proper point, whether there are rights in 
the mark against the claimed use to begin with and that these rights belong to the plaintiff. 
 
Asking the proper question becomes crucial in the virtual world context. We could focus on whether there is 
“commercial effect”37, whether the claimed use constitutes “trademark use” or whether the use is “non-
commercial”, but all these questions assume that there are trademark rights that are potentially infringed. Asking 
whether there are rights instead of whether there is infringement presents us not with a question of whether real 
world law applies, but whether real world law governs.  
5. Governance of virtual worlds 
The question of governance can be pursued as a principled or practical matter. On the one hand, virtual worlds 
are governed by the service provider and the Terms of Use, since the provider has factual control over the 
computer game (code).38 On the other hand, service providers are subject to obligations stemming from the 
Terms of Use and real world law. Consequently, virtual world governance extends past the service provider both 
on principle and in practice (fact). If governance is in this way detached from the service provider does it follow 
that only law can impact the service provider and in effect the computer game?  
 
Lessig argues that viewing regulation as merely legal regulation is fundamentally flawed. Instead, regulation 
can take four forms: law regulates, norms regulate, markets regulate and architecture regulates.39 None are fixed 
or pre-destined, but subject to human control, i.e. governance.40 The Magic Circle thus contains no magic; 
computer code is its architecture, the game rules are its norms, the Terms of Use are its laws and player 
interaction41 its market.42  
 
From a broader view of governance, computer code manifests itself as law (not governance) because of the 
game nature: in playgrounds the rules must be absolute or they allow spoiling of the game. However, computer 
code is not absolute in the sense that it could not be changed, nor is it absolute law, in-world or out-world. This 
goes to the heart of Lessig’s argument of computer code as Man-made architecture, not as divine or natural 
matter.43 What is Man-made is and can be governed. Computer code, as law and in-world architecture, at any 
given time, reflects our choice of governance, but also our choice of balance of values.44  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Bellure NV, Malaika Investments Ltd and Starion International Ltd, [2009] ECR I-5185); and the L’Oreal v eBay - case 
(Case C-324/09 L’Oréal SA, Lancôme parfums et beauté & Cie, Laboratoire Garnier & Cie, L’Oréal (UK) Limited v eBay 
International AG, eBay Europe SARL and eBay (UK) Limited [2011] ECR I-0000).  
37
 Article 2 and 3 of WIPO Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Marks and Other Industrial 
Property Rights in Signs on the Internet, adopted by the Assembly of the Paris Union for the Protection of Industrial Property 
and the General Assembly of the World Intellectual Property Organization at the Thirty-Sixth Series of Meetings of the 
Assemblies of the Member States of WIPO September 24 to October 3, 2001. WIPO Publication 845. 
38
 Lim argues that there is due cause to monitor the monitor in order to secure the rights of players against maltreatment and 
unfounded disciplinary action by service providers. Lim 2009 at 1054-1055. 
39
 Lessig (1999) Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, Basic Books, at 88. 
40
 Lessig 1999 at 90. The rules are not fixed by God or to be found in nature. 
41
 Where the service provider acts as umpire. 
42
 This example is not a statement confirming the legal argument that is that real world law does not extend within the Magic 
Circle, only an example that all forms of regulation exist also in a virtual world as much as outside it. 
43
 Lessig 1999 at 90. 
44
 Lessig at 7 and 91 talks of a Constitution or rules that lay the foundation of a society and law. It forms a structure for 
governance, but also reflects the substantive values by which we govern. 
 JICLT 
Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology    
Vol. 7, Issue 2 (2012) 
119 
 
 
 
For the purposes of the argument made here, it is important to note a distinction to Lessig’s main argument in 
Code. It is advocated here that computer code as architecture and law in fact, is enhanced in virtual worlds, 
because of their game nature. The game nature as a sociological phenomenon described by Huizinga through the 
concept of the Magic Circle, dictates the absoluteness of rules. The technological nature of the playground 
boundaries may make the rules seem more absolute than they in fact are, but the game settings in virtual worlds, 
like any rules of a game, continuously change with play through the interaction between players and players and 
the service provider. Rules, although fixed for every occurrence of a game, are on a time-spectrum in fact 
dynamic and fluid, another essential element of keeping the fun character in the game. By contrast, law tends to 
be detailed, fairly static and slow to change. It is argued here only45 that computer code is architecture and 
absolute in character from the perspective of regulating behavior in-world at any given time.46   
 
Governance occurs through different means of regulation. Regulation entails both active, positive acts of 
regulating in a specific manner, but also passive acts of allowing other means of regulation to govern. Regulation 
by law, although only one of four regulatory forces, is generally the most efficient form of regulation, because it 
comes with an established and direct enforcement mechanism with a manifested steering effect of behaviour. By 
contrast social norms are less effective at steering behaviour as we saw in the player-killing example.  
 
While the architecture (computer code) in the virtual world context is a very effective regulator of in-world 
actions, its keeper is easily influenced by real world interests through regulation by both law and market. The 
combined forces of market and law may thus cause the service provider to self-regulate and further strengthen 
the influence of regulation by law and market by manifestation in the architecture. Computer code in virtual 
worlds is not governed by an invisible hand, it is very clear who you should seek to influence, if you want 
changes to occur in-world. This is true for non-players that may seek to influence directly by increased 
enforcement or claims of infringement or liability, or indirectly through changes in law.  
 
Removal of the protection of law or inaction is regulation in that it maintains the status quo of rights in 
changed circumstances. Thus, both the existence of and lack of specific regulation constitutes regulation that 
affects law as governance and may force a change of computer code (architecture) and the law as we know it. 
Changing computer code constitutes in-world and real world governance, not merely governance of a 
community within a magic circle, because it restrikes the balance of interests in society, i.e. changes values. 
Values are not governed by space, but people and their elected representatives through the established structures 
and rules of society. The foundation for governance in-world and out-world is shared as is its structure and 
substance, and should not be reduced to a question of whether real world laws can be transferred and applied as 
such, in-world.  
6. Conclusion 
Whether it is possible to have your Avatar wear Nike shoes, drink Starbuck’s coffee and sell virtual Mercedes 
cars for a living, is a question of values. Is it harmless fun, or is it infringement of another’s intellectual property 
rights? Answering either-or is a question of real world governance and the striking of a balance between 
competing interest groups and values that constitutes active regulation by law. Reducing the question to either 
one, without considering the other, constitutes passive regulation by law that allows other forms of regulation to  
                                                          
45
 It concerns “how things are”, not “how they should be”. Thus, it is not intended as a statement on “the problems that 
perfection makes” that Lessig discusses (p.139), e.g. making legal acts impossible in cyberspace. Post counter-claims that the 
possibilities of fine-tuned technology allows for more specifically tailored methods making illegal acts impossible in 
cyberspace. See Post (2000) What Larry Doesn’t Get:Code, Law and Liberty in Cyberspace, 52 Stanford L. Rev. 1439 at 
1447. 
46
 It would be tempting to go further and discuss what computer code of virtual worlds ought to be and what balance it should 
strike in trademark law. This article, however, stops short and discusses building an awareness of the foundation for 
application of trademark law in virtual worlds. It asks if we can apply real world trademark law as it would be applied in the 
real world, in the virtual world context? 
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more easily influence the outcome. In the latter scenario, non-players may influence the service provider by e.g. 
demanding changes in computer code, Terms of Use or their enforcement. By bringing suit against the service 
provider for facilitating or turning a blind eye to rampant trademark infringement in-world the question of 
governance can be reduced to real world parties and real world law without consideration of the fundamental 
question of whether trademark rights extend to and who owns them in-world.  
 
Regardless of whether we choose to protect trademarks or not in virtual worlds, we should, I argue, make a 
conscious decision. Choosing not to regulate by law is merely a value judgment in favour of extending 
established rights positions into new areas without a re-calibration of the balance of competing interests. 
Protecting rights without a defined object, or intangible objects without asking who owns them in virtual worlds, 
may just ruin the fun for everyone. 
 
 
 
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 
 
    
 
